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Abstract:
To nudge is to design choice contexts in order to improve choice outcomes. Richard Thaler
and Cass Sunstein emphatically endorse nudging but reject more restrictive means. In
contrast, I argue that the behavioral psychology that motivates nudging also motivates
what may be called jolting—i.e. the design of choice content. I defend nudging and jolting
by distinguishing them from the sometimes oppressive means with which they can be im-
plemented, by responding to some common arguments against nudging, and by showing
how respect for preferences over option sets and their aggregate properties may require
the trimming of option sets, as well as helpful choice contexts.
Keywords: Choice Design, Default-setting, Incentives, Nudging, Respect for Preferences.
1. Introduction
Impressed with recent findings in behavioral psychology, both scholars and poli-
cy-makers have recently proposed that we should actively design the context in
which choices are made, in order to make choices wiser.1 Such design is usually
called nudging, after Thaler and Sunstein’s 2008 book Nudge (new edition 2009).
In this article, I endorse nudging, though for somewhat different reasons than
those presented by Thaler and Sunstein. I also propose that if we should nudge,
we should also jolt: If we should design the choice context in order to improve
the outcomes of choices, we should also design the choice content with the same
intention. I endorse nudging and jolting as tools, to be used with caution in
the pursuit of legitimate aims. I do not endorse them as immune to misuse,
universal policy solutions, a third way in politics, or as having any such more
* I wish to thank all fellow participants at the panel on Paternalism and Libertarian Paternalism
at the Mancept Workshops in Political Theory in 2013, where an early version was fruitfully
discussed. Thanks to Lars Lindblom and Niklas Möller for helpful comments on a later draft.
Thanks also to participants of the philosophy seminar at Umeå University, especially Gunnar
Björnsson, for constructive comments. Thanks finally to two helpful reviewers for this journal.
This research was funded by the Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare,
under project 2009-2189.
1 For an overview over relevant findings in behavioral psychology over the past four decades, see
Kahneman 2011. For a number of detailed policy-proposals from academics, see Shafir 2013. On
implementations in the USA, see Sunstein 2013.
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extravagant properties that proponents have sometimes claimed for nudges, or
that critics have taken proponents to claim for them.
Let me illustrate the appeal of jolting with a personal experience: During
my graduate years at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, vending
machines were installed in the local subway station. The machines contained
bottled water, sweet drinks and candy bars. I remember being a rather frequent
customer to these machines from time to time. I was, however, a reluctant cus-
tomer, experiencing more regret than was usual after similar purchases from
manned kiosks. The machines caught me off guard, in a place where I did not
expect to be tempted, where I had to stand around waiting for the next subway
with nothing better to do than to survey my buying options. There were times
when I was genuinely glad to have access to the candy and drinks, but for the
most part I wished they were not there.
A nudging approach to subway vending machines would be to arrange the
order in which the items are displayed so as to make the least unhealthy prod-
ucts more salient (put them at eye level perhaps). The machines could also be
designed so as to be inconspicuous, and information on calorie intake or other
health effects could be displayed next to each product. These measures would
either activate potential customers’ otherwise latent rational deliberation (dis-
playing calories), or circumvent such deliberation (placement). Either way, the
content of the choice, that is the available products, would not be affected. The
nudging approach would not sanction changing the prices of the products, or,
even less, removing any of them.
Nudging is possible because choosers typically enter choice situations with-
out set and stable preferences. The fact that preferences are often indeterminate
in this sense can, however, also be exploited by jolts—i.e. by design of the choice
content. By adding and removing options, chooser preferences can be influenced
in much the same way as by nudging. Removing one option may cause some
other option to become more salient, or it may change chooser perspective on
the entire choice set. The large table may seem larger if the colossal table is
removed. The choice of sitting furniture will become a choice of armchairs if
the sofa is removed. Sometimes removing one option entails removing the fur-
ther options that this one option would open up. With no colossal table, there is
no need to choose between enormous tablecloths. Without vending machines in
subway stations, there is no need to choose between sweets.
Active design of the choice content, like active design of the choice context,
will partly determine what preferences are formed. Therefore, not even the re-
moval of currently preferred options need to conflict with anyone’s future pref-
erence. For choice design of either type, a choice made under the influence of
such design need not be experienced as in any way coerced or hindered. Re-
moving vending machines from subway stations, or not putting them out in the
first place, need not frustrate anyone’s preference for sweets, even though such
preferences are formed once the machines are in place.
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2. Nudging—Appeal and Aims
The argument for nudging rests on a rich body of research in the behavioral sci-
ences (most importantly behavioral psychology and experimental economics). It
is only because we can make reliable predictions of the behavioral effects of such
measures as product placement and information display at point of purchase,
on a group level, that nudging is taken seriously as a policy tool. Many find-
ings are disputed and research is ongoing, but some effects are very thoroughly
researched. For example, consider the exposure effect: We tend to like things
we have been exposed to earlier, regardless of whether we actively remember
such exposure, and regardless of whether earlier exposure was combined with a
positive experience (Bornstein 1989).
Critics correctly point out that many studies invoked by pro-nudgers concern
behavior in isolated cases, and typically in laboratory settings. This is no fault
of the studies; it is simply a consequence of the conditions and circumstances of
research. Large-scale behavioral change in real life settings is very expensive to
produce and difficult to isolate. It may be that the most solid evidence we can
find on the likely effects of real life nudging will come from comparative studies
of existing differences in choice environments, rather than from controlled ex-
periments (as proposed by Bovens 2012). Obviously, what would make nudging
truly appealing is if behavior can be reliably influenced in such a way that there
is significant impact on outcomes. It is arguably too early to say to what extent
this is possible.
What we can say is that the success of nudging can only be evaluated in rela-
tion to the outcomes sought. In formulating their pro-nudging political program,
Thaler and Sunstein have incorporated a political aim—to “make choosers bet-
ter off, as judged by themselves” (2009, 5). It seems this aim is proposed in large
part in order to avoid controversy (which would be in line with Sunstein’s long-
time preference for “incompletely theorized agreements”—see Sunstein 1995).
However, the justification that “we are just giving people what they want” has
never been unproblematic in political contexts. It is all the more problematic in
light of the behavioral research that underpins nudging. One of the best known
results in behavioral psychology is that preferences vary with how alternatives
are described, even when descriptions are short and clear and have logically
equivalent content (McNeil et al. 1982). Moreover, even if it were unambiguous
what every person judged to be good for her, in every regard, it would be contro-
versial how to aggregate these judgments or preferences into a social preference,
which we would have to do for any nudge that affects groups rather than sin-
gle individuals. Such aggregation issues are explored in social choice theory.
Furthermore, even if individual judgments were aggregated in some uncontro-
versial manner, it is far from uncontroversial that we as a society should strive
to promote our own wellbeing as judged by ourselves. Perhaps we should rather
strive for excellence, or perhaps we should make it a priority to preserve the
natural environment, or our own cultural artifacts.
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Thaler and Sunstein say very little on the aim of nudging. More generally,
pro-nudgers tend to sidestep the issue of the precise goal of nudging and so
whether this goal can be effectively achieved. This may be because Thaler and
Sunstein have presented two arguments that, if valid, indicate that it does not
matter much what nudging gives us, as long as it gives us something: The first
argument is that nudging is unavoidable. The second argument is that nudges
can easily be resisted and so pose no threat to liberty. If either of these argu-
ments is sound, whether we should use nudges on any one occasion would seem
to come down to straight-forward cost-benefit analysis, even if the input to such
analysis may be uncertain.
I propose that the argument from unavoidability should be accepted after
modification. I propose that the argument from preserved liberty should be re-
jected, for several reasons. I will develop and defend these claims in the follow-
ing two sections. The upshot is that in light of our increasing knowledge of the
behavioral effects of choice contexts, we have good reasons to design contexts
so as to promote legitimate aims. This leaves it an open question what these
legitimate aims are. I will not take a stand on this important question in this
contribution, but will rather assume that governments and other actors whose
decisions structure our choices can have legitimate aims and that, when they
do, these aims can be furthered by using nudges, as well as jolts.
3. Unavoidability and Moral Neutrality
The argument from unavoidability is arguably Thaler and Sunstein’s most im-
portant argument for nudging. It is the argument they focus most on in their
2003 article (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 1171–1183). They introduce the argu-
ment early on in Nudge:
“In many situations, some organization or agent must make a choice
that will affect the behavior of some other people. There is, in those
situations, no way of avoiding nudging in some direction.” (Thaler
and Sunstein 2009, 5)
Thaler and Sunstein return to this argument frequently in the book, e.g. noting
in a late chapter that it has been “emphasized throughout” (2003, 240–241). In
his recent follow-up book Why Nudge?, Sunstein again emphasizes this argu-
ment, saying for example that “it cannot be repeated often enough [. . . ]: Choice
architecture is inevitable.” (2014, 118, original emphasis)
The argument from unavoidability is based on the straightforward observa-
tion that whenever something is designed, it will inevitably nudge people to-
wards some behavior or other, whether or not this is intended by the designer
or designers. What is designed may be a building, a search algorithm, or health
care reform. Whatever it is, the design will facilitate some behaviors and make
alternative options less salient, less attractive, or slightly less accessible. The
Expanding the Nudge 143
indication from behavioral science is that these features of the design will have
substantial effects on behavior in the aggregate. The argument from unavoid-
ability is that since nudging is both unavoidable and efficacious, we might as
well ensure that it is beneficial.
One weakness of this argument is that it fails to distinguish between nudging
that is intended to shift behavior in some particular direction, and nudging that
has no such aim and is in that sense unintended. Thaler and Sunstein explicitly
note that nudging can be either intended or unintended (or “unintentional”).
They downplay the distinction, since, in either case, “nudges can have major
effects” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 10). However, what critics are concerned
with is typically not that people are influenced by their choice contexts, but that
their choice contexts are designed, by others, with the intention of producing
some particular behavior.2
Intended nudging is not unavoidable. As Thaler and Sunstein note (2009,
10), it can be avoided by randomizing between design alternatives, though this
seems silly. Arguably, it can also be avoided by letting design decisions be made
on the basis of other things than behavioral effects, such as cost minimization or
aesthetic concerns. Consider the decoration of some large public area, such as a
square or a park. This project may offer opportunities to nudge people towards
exercise by placing exercise machines in strategic locations, or to nudge peo-
ple towards healthier lifestyles by displaying persuasive messages or pictures.
However, such nudging is easily avoided. Design decisions can be determined by
costs and aesthetics only—the most beauty for the buck. Different designs may
still affect behavior differently: A Zen garden may inspire meditation and large
open areas may inspire sport and play. However, if these effects, though perhaps
foreseen, do not provide motivating reason either for or against any particular
design, then I believe nudge skeptics will be silent.3
While intended nudging is not strictly speaking unavoidable, the argument
from unavoidability is strengthened by the fact that our knowledge of behav-
ioral psychology is steadily increasing and spreading. Once choice designers
have this knowledge, or even just the knowledge that such knowledge exists,
their decision problems change irrevocably: Enlightened choice designers must
choose between either using findings from behavioral research to influence be-
havior in various directions, or actively avoiding such influence. Avoiding will
become more and more difficult as behavioral insights are disseminated through
the population. Large institutional choice designers like governments can com-
2 For example: “[Nudges] are manipulative, first because the government employs them with the
intention of affecting people’s choices.” (Grüne-Yanoff 2012, 636, my emphasis)
3 The role and moral significance of intentions is of course a much debated issue in moral philosophy
and there are several fine-grained distinctions. My analysis only presupposes the distinction
between on the one hand straight-forwardly intending something and, thereby, causing it, and
on the other hand causing something as a mere side-effect. This distinction is familiar from the
discussion on the controversial doctrine of double effect (for an overview, se McIntyre 2011, for
a critical discussion, see Scanlon 2008, e.g. 22–23). Importantly, I make this distinction only
to identify controversial forms of nudging. I do not thereby endorse the moral relevance of the
distinction.
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mission design according to formal requirements that include that behavioral
effects not be considered in design decisions. However, such requirements will
be difficult to monitor. Enlightened individual designers may still allow behav-
ioral effects to be decisive, especially when other criteria are not at issue or very
marginally affected. For example, the park designer may put benches in groups,
rather close and slightly facing each other, in order to promote socialization,
thinking that people in the area are alienated or lonely and would benefit from
more interaction. This arrangement may also be aesthetically pleasing and no
more costly than alternative arrangements.
Despite these considerations to strengthen the argument from unavoidabil-
ity, I believe that we must concede to the critics that intended nudging can often
be avoided, and sometimes quite easily. I propose, however, that whether or not
nudges are intended is not morally relevant. One way to phrase this is to say
that the mere intention to influence behavior via choice context is not morally
problematic. Another way of phrasing it is to say that choice contexts are not
morally neutral just because they have come about unintentionally. I therefore
call this argument for nudging the argument from non-neutrality.
It may be that some behaviors are morally problematic, or impermissible, if
and only if they are intended. Clearly, however, merely influencing other peo-
ple’s behavior via design of their environment is not one of those behaviors. Con-
sider putting up a warning sign by a power station, with the effective intention
to cause people to avoid trespassing, or be more mindful of where they are go-
ing. This is not morally problematic. Therefore, if intended nudging is morally
problematic in a way that unintended nudging is not, there must be something
about nudging beyond its influence on behavior that explains this difference. I
will consider and tentatively reject some such possibilities below.
At this point, I will bluntly declare that I do not believe that even intended
nudging, that is influence on choice and behavior via choice context, is by itself
morally problematic. If I pick one of two available warning signs because I know
its design is more likely to induce caution, this is in no way morally problematic.
If the park designer opts for yellow garbage cans in order to reduce littering,
this is equally unproblematic.
There are of course, for any agent, many things it may not do. Perhaps not
anybody has the right to put up that warning sign. Certainly not everyone has
the right to paint public garbage cans yellow. Perhaps the government has no
right to interfere with certain private exchanges. However, when some agent
has a general jurisdiction or right to shape or regulate some environment, there
is no general moral problem with doing so with the intention to influence choice
and behavior. What may be problematic is for an agent to influence behavior
with an aim that is not among that agent’s legitimate concerns.
I do not want to deny that there may be a special quality to the complete
absence of design. Perhaps one quality of untouched wilderness is that it does
not embody other people’s attempts to influence us in any way. If that is so, the
same could perhaps be said for artificial environments that are created without
any consideration for how they may influence us. Consider for example environ-
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ments we encounter when we travel to places that are built for people in other
circumstances and that have not (yet) adjusted themselves to visits from people
like us (i.e. to tourism). While I grant that these are possibilities, I propose that
if an environment is artificially designed for us, as most environments are for
most people living in them, then avoiding choice context design does not add any
special value to that environment.4
I conclude that, at least in artificial environments, there are no morally neu-
tral choice contexts. This implies that, for any choice context, if it can be cost-
lessly changed, leaving it unchanged requires justification in just the same way
as does changing it. A new choice context may bring greater risks than an ex-
isting one or it may upset legitimate expectations, but this cannot be taken for
granted in any one case. Sometimes avoiding risks and meeting legitimate ex-
pectations favor changing a choice context. Consider for example a change in
the default employment contract to include a retirement savings plan.5 This
change seems to reduce long-term risks and to honor employees’ legitimate ex-
pectations of their employers or of their government to care for their long-term
financial wellbeing.
The argument from non-neutrality is more robust than the argument from
unavoidability because intended nudging is not, strictly speaking, unavoidable.
The argument from non-neutrality is also stronger because that nudging is un-
avoidable is consistent with its being morally neutral, and so requiring no jus-
tification. This would imply, for example, that in the face of controversy over
changes, choice contexts could unproblematically be left as they currently are.
Because no choice contexts are morally neutral, however, we should prefer that
context that is most conducive to the legitimate aims of the choice designer, un-
less there is some other moral issue at stake. Again, I will consider some such
moral issues below, after I introduce choice content design. Before I even do that,
however, I will consider and reject Thaler and Sunstein’s second main argument
for nudging.
4. Significant Incentive Effects
Thaler and Sunstein’s second main and recurring argument for nudging is that
since it does not significantly affect incentives, it poses no threat to liberty.
Nudging is, as they put it, “freedom-preserving”, and this in contrast to many
other measures the government can take to promote welfare.6 There are two
4 This is not to deny that there are down-sides to the comprehensive reliance on design throughout
society. Such reliance might cause the loss of spontaneity and of chance discoveries, including
discoveries of new legitimate aims. On this, see Dworkin 1988.
5 On the effects of such rules on enrollment, see Beshears et al. 2009.
6 Thaler and Sunstein say “liberty-preserving” in Nudge (2009, 5) and Sunstein says “freedom-
preserving” in Simpler (2013, 2). Like them, I make no distinction between these concepts in
this context. It is because nudging is allegedly freedom-preserving that the pro-nudging position
has been called ‘libertarian paternalism’. This label is contested, for good reasons. It completely
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steps in this argument: 1) Nudges do not significantly affect incentives. 2) Mea-
sures that do not significantly affect incentives preserve freedom. I will argue
that both steps are unwarranted, for independent reasons.
Before evaluating the freedom-preservation argument, I must note a con-
ceptual complication relating to step 1: Many would consider it a necessary
condition for some measure to be a nudge that it does not significantly affect
incentives. Indeed, this condition is generally taken for granted in the debate.
For example, noted critics of nudging Hausman and Welch sum up their un-
derstanding of the concept so: “Nudges are ways of influencing choice without
limiting the choice set or making alternatives appreciably more costly in terms
of time, trouble, social sanctions, and so forth.” (2010, 126, my emphasis) If this
is right, it is incoherent to question whether nudges significantly affect incen-
tives or not. Moreover, some would even consider it a necessary condition for
some measure to be a nudge that it is freedom-preserving. For example, Yashar
Saghai’s development of the concept explicitly incorporates this condition (2013,
487). Having noted these conceptual complications, I will persist in treating the
claim that nudges are freedom-preserving as an argument for the moral inno-
cence of nudges, rather than as a semantic thesis about what defines a nudge.
Step 2 of the argument can be evaluated independently of the concept of
nudging. I propose that this claim does not hold up to scrutiny. Whether or
not some measure preserves freedom depends, of course, on what freedom is.
Without attempting to summarize the contemporary debate on the nature of
freedom, I will simply claim that here is strong consensus in this debate that the
imposition of costs limits freedom in one way or other. If an option is rendered
more costly, I am less free to choose it. At least if this option is my preferred
option, I am thereby rendered less free. The option is, as Philip Pettit puts it,
replaced by a “burdened counterpart” (2009, 11). For another example, consider
Isaiah Berlin’s view that a person’s freedom is “a function of what doors, and
how many, are open to him; upon what prospects they open; and how open they
are.” (2002[1969], 41) Doors are more open if they are less costly to take. There
are, of course, exceptions to the consensus. Thomas Hobbes seems to have held
the view that you are free to do something as long as you are physically able to
do so, regardless of the costs involved.7
Assuming that costs typically do limit freedom, is there some threshold of
significance under which they fail to do so? I know of no principled argument
to this effect. It may for practical reasons be pointless or pedantic to insist on
the loss of freedom when it is very small, but I see no theoretical reason to
disregards the rich libertarian tradition built around strong ownership rights. ‘Libertarianism’
in the present context only means the priority of freedom of choice over other values. I will not
engage further with this terminological issue.
7 Some contemporary authors hold that one is free to do whatever one is physically able to do,
regardless of costs, but they then also hold that imposed costs diminish one’s overall freedom
(Steiner 1994; Carter and Kramer 2008). Pettit is an exception in that he holds that costs only
diminish freedom if they are imposed arbitrarily, but then he holds that this goes for any measure,
including outright compulsion (e.g. Pettit 1997).
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disregard it.8 We may think that particular freedoms, such as the freedom of
speech, are preserved even if their exercise is costly, in the sense that people
are sufficiently free to speak (sufficiently to claim that democratic rights are
respected etc.). However, it is unwarranted to claim quite generally that freedom
is preserved if costs or burdens are small. At the very least, this claim requires
some specification as to what defines the threshold and why smaller costs are
irrelevant from the perspective of freedom. Thaler and Sunstein offer no such
specification or argument.
If light of these observations, I propose that even if nudges were “easy and
cheap to avoid” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 19), this would not by itself imply
that they preserve freedom. Many nudges limit freedom only very little, but
it is important not to confuse small costs with no costs. This is particularly
important since nudges are intended to be used extensively and since a series of
small costs may be large in the aggregate. Changing a default rule from opt-in
to opt-out may impose only very small costs on choosers who will actively opt
out under the new rule. However, with a growing number of such changes, costs
may not stay low. Choosers who are consistent outliers may have to constantly
opt out of arrangements set up to benefit the typical chooser.9 Sunstein has
noted this potential problem and proposed in response that default rules may
be personalized (2014, 99). However, this does nothing to strengthen the claim
that small costs do not limit liberty.10
In evaluating step 2 of the freedom-preservation argument, we must keep
distinct the independent argument from non-neutrality (and the argument from
unavoidability). Some features of choice contexts are unavoidable. For example,
there must often be a default rule, and there is typically a cost to opting out,
whichever option is the default. The opt-out cost is not neutral under any par-
ticular default, and so it is both physically and morally unavoidable that there
be some opt-out cost. This may imply that the setting of a default does not di-
minish freedom.11 If it does imply this, however, this may be because the cost is
8 Libertarians in particular are typically unwilling to accept even limited state interference with
voluntary free market transactions that do not harm third parties. Distortions can be larger or
smaller, but they are distortions all the same. This is another reason for why the term ‘libertarian
paternalism’ is so contentious.
9 Sarah Conly (2013) considers the burdens on consistent outliers a valid objection to coercive pa-
ternalism, though not decisive, since these burdens may be outweighed by benefits to non-outliers
(64–66).
10 None of this is meant to deny that some nudges may impose no costs at all. Using different sorts of
framing effects may affect the salience of different options without making any alternative more
costly.
11 More specifically, freedom is not diminished by setting a default if freedom is about what options
are available to us at what cost. It may diminish freedom if freedom is about what causes us
to have the options we have. For example, some hold that freedom can only be diminished by
intentional action. On such a theory of freedom, changing a default rule may diminish freedom
even if the new default rule is welcomed by choosers, provides a richer set of options, and improves
chooser wellbeing. For what it is worth, I find this implication an embarrassment for such views
of freedom.
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unavoidable, not because it is small. If so, it is the argument from non-neutrality
that is doing the work.
For an example, assume a work-out machine is available for employees at
some workplace. Consider a rule that requires employees to fill out a brief
lifestyle questionnaire before using the machine. The intention may be to nudge
towards health-promoting lifestyle changes (unrelated to safe use of the ma-
chine). This requirement entails an added cost of using the machine. Assuming
this cost is insignificant, it is the right sort of cost to consider in evaluating
the freedom-preservation argument. However, consider now that the machine
has two different settings, for doing two different exercises, and that changing
between settings is a bit cumbersome. When not in use, the machine automati-
cally returns to the default setting. The employer picks a default. For users who
prefer the non-default setting, switching is an added cost of using the machine,
perhaps just as large as filling out the lifestyle questionnaire. However, given
that preferences vary in the group, and given how cumbersome it is to change
the settings on this machine, it is unavoidable that some users face this cost. If
this sort of cost does not diminish freedom, this is likely due to unavoidability,
or non-neutrality, rather than to the smallness of the cost.
If I am right in rejecting step 2 of the freedom-preservation argument, step 1
on its own will not make an argument. However, I may not be right. Also, step 1
is of interest either way, for two reasons. First, and most obviously, if nudges can
have more than insignificant incentive effects, this will make it (even) harder to
argue that they are freedom-preserving. Second, less obviously, the claim that
nudges have only insignificant incentive effects entails further problems for the
pro-nudging position.
Consider the setting of a default rule that will affect 100 people and where
there are two possibilities:
Risky default: Everyone can opt out at insignificant cost. 89 persons will do so.
11 persons will not and so risk serious harm.
Safe default: Everyone can opt out but the cost is significant. One person will do
so. This person will risk serious harm.
If step 1 is correct, then setting the risky default will be a nudge, while setting
the safe default will not be, since with this default the opt-out cost is not insignif-
icant. This may be problematic for two independent reasons: First, default-
setting is a paradigmatic example of a nudge, as well as of the unavoidability of
choice context. If some default-settings are not nudges, this would not only raise
questions regarding the concept of a nudge, it would seriously weaken the argu-
ment from unavoidability: If people are not nudged by the safe default, then we
can easily avoid nudging in this case, contrary to Thaler and Sunstein’s unavoid-
ability claim. Note that this point is independent of intent: The safe default is
no nudge, whether or not it is set intentionally.
Second, the safe default seems very attractive in the example. The opt-out
cost for the one person may be significant for her in some sense—i.e. it may cost
her some real money, or substantial effort. This cost, however, seems rather
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unimportant in relation to the risk of serious harm to ten people. Especially so
since there need not be any benefit to the ten, and they may have no independent
or stable preference for the risky option. Their failure to opt out may simply be
due to inertia, misunderstanding, or any other non-rational influence. This is
not to mention that the individually insignificant cost to the 89 people who opt
out under the risky default may in the aggregate be comparable to or greater
than the one significant opt-out cost. All this means that if nudges do not sig-
nificantly affect incentives, there seems to be little reason to prefer nudges over
non-nudging default-settings. Even more to the point, it seems highly question-
able whether nudges are more freedom-preserving than non-nudging default-
settings.
To further illustrate my point, consider this possible story behind the two
default rules: In a public park on a mountain, there are two foot paths. One
is rather dangerous but has a spectacular view. The other one is safe but has
a slightly less spectacular view. A ranger hut (or something) must be placed
at the entrance to the park, where both paths begin. Because of the difficult
terrain (and the low budget) there are only very limited options for placing the
hut. It can either be placed so that it will hide the safe path from view, or it can
be placed so that it blocks the dangerous path entirely, making it accessible only
via a long detour. Assume that information on the two paths is readily available,
perhaps from a large map on site, and that the dangerous path is marked with a
clear warning sign. Still, with the safe path hidden from view some people will
take the dangerous route. Most of them will do so not because they consider the
view worth the risk, but because they are absent-minded and do not pay much
attention to maps and signs. They are intent on hiking and they will just not
bother to look for the safe path. These are the ten people who will (happily) take
the safe path under the safe default, but will (inadvertently) take the dangerous
path under the risky default. One person will take the dangerous path even if
she must take the long detour, perhaps because experiencing spectacular views
is just that important to her.12
At times, Thaler and Sunstein indicate that their position is not that nudging
has or should have only insignificant incentive effects, but rather that opt-out
costs should be kept low whenever possible. For example: “Our goal is to allow
people to go their own way at the lowest possible cost.” (2009, 252) This posi-
tion would be consistent with preferring the safe default in the example and in
general to prefer the best default all things considered, irrespective of the size
of the (minimal) incentive effect. However, to take up this position would also
be to give up the freedom-preservation argument.
In conclusion, both steps in the freedom-preservation argument are deeply
problematic. As noted in the first paragraph of this section, the limited impact
on incentives is generally considered part of the essence of nudging. If we reject
the freedom-preservation argument, and in particular its first step, where does
12 Another possibility is that not ten but eleven persons are absent-minded and eager hikers, while
one person would be triggered by the blocking of the dangerous path and take it just because it is
blocked (“no one is going to stop me from hiking wherever I want”).
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this leave the concept of nudging? I propose to give up on limited incentive
effects and define nudging only in terms of effects on choice outcome from choice
context, or, as Thaler and Sunstein prefer to say, from choice architecture. We
can then say that some nudges are freedom-preserving and that this is a virtue
of those nudges. However, as pro-nudgers we should not hold that all nudges
have this virtue. If my proposal is conceptually too radical, the alternative is to
keep the insignificant incentive effects condition on nudging, and instead give
up some common claims on the virtues of nudging relative to other influences on
choice.
5. Choice Content Design
I have argued that the non-neutrality of choice contexts indicates that nudging,
i.e. choice context design, can and often should be used to promote legitimate
aims. I have postponed discussion of some counter-arguments in order to simul-
taneously consider those arguments as they apply to both nudging and jolting—
i.e. to choice context design as well as to choice content design. In this section,
I will present my prima facie case for choice content design. I will explain how,
just like nudging, jolting has non-rational influence on choosers. In the subse-
quent section, I will argue that relevant counter-arguments to jolting also apply
to nudging, and so that if we should nudge, we should also jolt.
One criticism of nudging is that it is no new policy tool, but merely a new
name for established methods of changing and steering behavior by adjusting
the living environment so as to “make healthy choices the easy choices”, as the
public health pioneer Nancy Milio put it already in 1976 (Quoted from Vall-
gårda 2011, 201, who develops this critique). This critique is warranted in light
of some exaggerated claims to novelty, but I believe the concept of nudging, and
the discussion it has spurred, has helped many of us realize that all choices
have contexts, and that these contexts can be designed so as to promote some
outcomes at the expense of others. To use nudging as a policy tool partly means,
I propose, to adapt a perspective on choice contexts as ever-present and des-
ignable. It means, furthermore, to consider, in light of behavioral science and
the peculiarities of the choice at hand, what designs could promote legitimate
aims. It means, finally, to implement these designs. Established policy tools
such as social advertising certainly aim to change choice contexts. However, I
propose that it is a relatively new or at least under-utilized idea to perceive the
context of a choice in its entirety as an object of design.
Similarly, to use choice content design as a tool means to adapt the perspec-
tive that choice contents are ever-present and designable. It is to perceive the
creation, regulation and shaping of choice contents as a design problem. It is,
specifically, to pay attention to the many ways in which choice content affects
what is chosen. Such effects are not limited to the obvious circumstance that
options that are not accessible will not be chosen. Behavioral science has shown
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that just as choice contexts can affect what is chosen in surprising and arguably
non-rational ways, so can choice contents. The most well-know example of this
is probably shifting preferences among options as they are complemented with
additional options. Seemingly rational people who prefer A to B in the set {A, B}
may prefer B to A in the set {A, B, C} (see e.g. Tversky 1972). The rationality of
such shifts in preference is much discussed in normative decision theory. Their
reality, however, is undisputed.
I will now explain and defend choice content design by considering some vari-
ations on the now famous (in some quarters infamous) cafeteria case, introduced
by Sunstein and Thaler (2003, 1164). Like the original case, mine is hypotheti-
cal. In expanding on the case, I will invoke psychological explanations of choice
behavior that I hope will be both intuitively plausible and consistent with main
trends in current psychological research.
Let us, like Sunstein and Thaler, “consider the cafeteria at some organiza-
tion” (ibid.). In order to avoid special concerns with children or minors, let the
cafeteria be one for adult employees.13 For some reason, this cafeteria must
serve deserts (perhaps employees demand it). However, the cafeteria director
has considerable leeway to decide what desserts to offer and how to present
them to customers.
Assume that the status quo is serving six desserts, A–F. That this is the
status quo may mean that these are the desserts that are offered at present,
or it may mean that these are the desserts that are available from the current
supplier, or it may mean that they are the desserts the director first comes to
think of. In order to discuss the case, I need to assume a ranking of these options
in terms of some legitimate aim. Assume, therefore, that promoting employee
health is a legitimate aim for this cafeteria director, perhaps by mandate from
central management. In terms of this aim, the desert options are ranked from
A, which is best, to F, which is worst.
Let us now consider, true to liberal fundamentals, an individual dessert-
craving costumer. In the status quo, this customer will opt for F. However, by
changing the order in which desserts are displayed, the director can cause the
customer to opt for E. This may be achieved, for example, by placing E earlier in
the line or giving it a more pronounced placement. This is nudging.
The director cannot, by any sort of choice context design, cause the customer
to opt for any of A–D. However, the director can also design the choice content:
By introducing a new option G, the director can cause the customer to opt for D.
G may be, for example, an option that is even less healthy than F, and more obvi-
ously unhealthy, making the costumer conscious of the health effects of desserts
and so causing her to opt for something less unhealthy. Moreover, by removing
the options A and B, the director can cause the costumer to opt for C. This may
be, for example, because the customer is attracted to the least unhealthy option
given that it is not too healthy (and so not too dull).
13 Thaler and Sunstein introduce this complication in Nudge, seemingly unnecessarily, by changing
their example relative to their earlier rendering.
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These two instances of choice content design are different in that one widens
the scope of choice and the other restricts it. We may say that the first increases
freedom, while the second limits freedom. To limit freedom is often seen as
illiberal, and correctly so, but this judgment should not be made too hastily
in any one case. More choice is not always better than less, nor is it always
preferred by choosers. More options generally make choosing more cumbersome
and make it more difficult to identify one’s favored option. More options also
increase the risk of making a mistake in choosing, and if the extra options are
poor they raise the stakes involved in such mistake. All this may make more
choice both less desirable and, sometimes, less desired.14
Furthermore, we should not be unduly influenced by the fact that I have
presented the design problem in relation to the choice set A–F, assumed to be
the status quo. This status quo may well be morally arbitrary. I offered as a
possible explanation for this status quo that A–F might be what the current
supplier has to offer. However, there may be no reason to favor this supplier
(there may even be reason to favor a different supplier). More generally, it is
often the case that some agent, government or otherwise, must design a choice
from scratch, with no status quo to defer to. When the cafeteria opens for the
first time, there may be only two sorts of constraints: The requirement that
desserts should be available, and practical constraints such as limited fridge
room and the financial incentive to avoid waste. Now, should the director offer
five or ten or twenty different desserts? A higher number is clearly not always
better, even for customers—just consider the inconvenience of having to choose
between five hundred different desserts, displayed along a long line, or listed on
a long menu. An adaptive choice mechanism such as a search tool with dynamic
categories could mitigate the downsides of too many options, but that just goes to
show that the number of options should not be maximized, but instead adjusted
in relation to other features of the choice environment, such as searchability, as
well as to what values are at stake.15
Returning to our hypothetical cafeteria director, the choice content designs
already discussed—adding an unhealthy G and removing the relatively healthy
A and B—do not exhaust his options. The director can also remove F, causing
the customer to opt for B. This may be, for example, because F is quite tempting
and so with F out of sight (and smell), the customer’s willpower is more intact
and so she opts for a rather healthy dessert.
14 On these and other downsides of choice, see Dworkin 1982. It has been observed that too many
options cause customers to refrain from choosing. For a recent economic model for preferences over
choice sets with varying numbers of alternatives, see Kuksov and Villas-Boas 2009. For readers
concerned that choices be rational, note that removing options can cause one’s set of preferences
to be more coherent. As noted above, even seemingly rational people may prefer A in the set {A,
B} and yet prefer B in the set {A, B, C}. By removing C from the latter set, this incoherence (if it
is one) is also removed. In the status quo, of course, people may not even be seemingly rational.
15 The status quo need not be morally arbitrary of course. If the cafeteria has been offering a cer-
tain set of options for some time, and customers have grown accustomed to having those options
available, it may frustrate legitimate expectations to remove these options.
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F is the option the customer would have chosen in the status quo. It may
therefore seem particularly problematic to remove this option. However, I have
concluded that the status quo is often morally irrelevant. ‘Removing’ is really
a misnomer. We should rather talk of non-inclusion. It may perhaps still seem
particularly problematic not to include options that would have been chosen if
they were included. However, F is not the only such option. B is chosen from the
set {A, B, C, D, E}. Relative to this set, non-inclusion of A and B and inclusion
of F will cause a choice of E or F, depending on choice context. Does this mean
that non-inclusion of B, E or F is particularly problematic? It does not. Almost
all options would be chosen from some choice set. Even the tasteless A would be
chosen over the directly harmful Z, or the even more tasteless A’. This does not,
of course, imply that all options should be included in the actual choice set.
My cafeteria example shows how choice content can influence choice in other
ways than by blocking a choice of some option by removing it, or causing a choice
of some option by adding it. Some or all of the hypothetical influences may ap-
pear non-rational. Consider how the mere presence of G makes the value of
health more salient to the customer. On the face of it, it does not seem ra-
tional to value health higher because an additional option is present. On the
other hand, guarding against unhealthy choices is more important the more un-
healthy are the available options. It is often hard to say what is rational and
what is not. I take no stand on such issues. The point is that there are diverse
and intricate ways in which choice content determines choice. Depending on
the circumstances, these effects can to some extent be predicted and so choice
content designed on the basis of such predictions.
6. Arguments Presented against Nudging
As stated in the very first paragraph of this article, I endorse nudging and jolt-
ing only as tools to be used with caution and in the pursuit of legitimate aims.
Importantly, I do not endorse libertarian paternalism. I emphasize this, since
Thaler and Sunstein have coined both expressions and consistently present them
as intimately interconnected. However, and Thaler and Sunstein do not deny
this, libertarian paternalism is the idea that nudging should be used for par-
ticular purposes (the promotion of subjective wellbeing discussed above) and for
particular reasons (including the freedom-preservation argument that I have re-
jected). Naturally, these purposes and reasons have attracted criticism that is
not relevant to nudging as such.
Nudging should be distinguished not only from its various possible justi-
fications (and their controversial names), but also from different means that
may be used for its implementation. Like any tool, nudging can be misused.
Thoughtful descriptions of alternatives is typically a non-intrusive nudge: One
of two equally concise, clear and relevant descriptions can sometimes yield bet-
ter health outcomes than the other. However, alternatives can also be described
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with reference to completely irrelevant properties, in a manner that simply con-
fuses choosers, or choosers can be overwhelmed with too much relevant infor-
mation. Such misuse must not be confused with the tool itself.
In the very same way, we should distinguish between inherent problems with
choice content designs and contingent problems that may or may not be associ-
ated with such designs. Such problems may be more or less directly moral. They
may concern duties or rights or they may concern consequences in a wider sense.
Non-inclusion of an option that the chooser has a right to will of course imply a
rights violation. Removing an option by criminal prohibition is generally very
costly and very intrusive (see e.g. Husak 2013). For both of these sorts of rea-
sons, some authors oppose criminalization of unhealthy or otherwise harmful
behavior, but favor non-legalization in the form of prohibitions on the manufac-
turing and distribution of the means to such harmful behavior, or otherwise the
facilitation of this behavior (e.g. De Marneffe 2009, concerning prostitution). As
John Stuart Mill proposed, though the government has no right to decide, “for
purposes of repression or punishment”, that some conduct should be prohibited,
it may be right “in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which
are not disinterested, of instigators who [. . . ] have a direct personal interest on
one side” (1859, chapter V, 8th paragraph). At least Mill found “considerable
force in these arguments” (ibid.). These are complicated matters. The point is
only that a choice set can sometimes be limited quite easily and at little or no
cost, as when the cafeteria director decides against adding another dessert to
the menu, or for subtracting one previously on it, while other times such limi-
tation of options is much more difficult and can only be achieved via measures
that are in themselves oppressive or illiberal. To endorse choice content design
is not to endorse such oppressive measures.
With these distinctions in mind, I will turn now to some arguments that
target nudging understood as a tool.16 In the previous section, I tried to rebut
two arguments against jolting specifically: That it limits freedom and that it
removes options that would otherwise have been chosen. I expect that an oppo-
nent of nudging would be likely to consider the arguments I will now discuss to
tell against jolting as well. The recent literature on arguments against nudging,
and their refutations, is very large. I can only very briefly consider what I take
to be the three most frequently voiced arguments: That (intentional) nudging is
deceitful or non-transparent, that it is manipulative, and that it prevents moral
development. Though it would be useful to consider these arguments in further
detail, I will limit myself to pointing out some weaknesses in them and to ex-
plain why they are no stronger against jolting than against nudging. This will
serve to strengthen both of my theses: That we should nudge, and that if we
should nudge, we should also jolt.
16 I will not consider general arguments against involvement in other people’s lives, especially by
the government. There are of course legitimate concerns with the incompetence and corruption of
people in the government and elsewhere, but these concerns are too general to warrant treatment
here.
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The claim that nudging is deceitful has an empirical part and a normative
part. The empirical part is that nudges often or always work best, or only work
at all, when they are covert—i.e. when nudgees do not know they are being
nudged. Claims to this effect are typically unsubstantiated.17 One recent study
indicates that default-setting has substantial effects even when people are in-
formed immediately prior to their choice that they have been defaulted into
one of the options.18 More generally, it seems psychologically very likely that
whether or not being informed that one is being nudged has any effect on the
impact of the nudge depends on whether nudgees have any resistance to being
nudged.
The normative part of the argument is that it is deceitful not to inform
nudgees that they are being nudged. Luc Bovens (2009) has developed a version
of this claim in some detail, formulating it in terms of transparency. He proposes
that nudges, in order to be morally acceptable, should be possible to discern by
all nudgees (216–217). It is not clear what is the moral basis for this require-
ment. Bovens mocks political transparency, assuming such transparency can
only be general and not specific. However, political transparency typically en-
tails that information on policy is made available via established channels, easy
to find for those who seek it. Such information can be very detailed. Extensive
and detailed transparency (including what Bovens calls “token transparency”)
is consistent with lack of local discernibility. I propose that local discernibility
is far too demanding a requirement, especially considering that our living en-
vironment is the result of countless actions by other people, organizations and
institutions, many of which aim to influence our behavior one way or other.
Failing to see the force of the argument from deceit or lack of transparency,
I speculate that it is fueled by some underlying worry. Perhaps by this two-
fold concern: First, we may be nudged, and jolted, according to someone else’s
agenda. This may be problematic in itself, and especially so if the agenda is
not in our best interest, or not what we prefer, or not what we would prefer
after due informed consideration. Second, nudges, and jolts, can be plentiful,
subtle, and individually relatively insignificant.19 This means that we will not
pay attention to them, will not be motivated to try to counter them, and may not
even have sufficient reason to do so in any one case. The result can be that we
are under the potentially malign influence of other people, with no obvious way
17 For example, Adam Burgess claims that “nudges are likely to work best precisely when they
are not transparent” (2012, 11). Burgess provides no support for this claim, but only refers to
Luc Bovens 2009, who first speculates that if we let people know they are being nudged, “the
intervention may be less successful” (209), then simply asserts that “these techniques do work
best in the dark” (217).
18 In a presently unpublished manuscript accessible through the Social Science Research Network,
George Loewenstein, Cindy Bryce, David Hagmann and Sachin Rajpal conclude: “Pre-informing
people of defaults did not have a measurable impact on their effectiveness.” (Accessed 28 march
2014 at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2417383)
19 Somewhat similarly, Sunstein speculates in his most recent book that the worry with trans-
parency is really a worry about the limited salience of nudges. Sunstein rejects this worry as
unfounded since many nudges are quite salient (2014, 148–149).
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out. More direct and more harmful influences are typically more easily noted
and countered. If I am right in my speculation, the transparency and deceit
worry is actually a worry about manipulation.
In the nudging debate, explicit arguments from manipulation do not have
this form. Instead, they point out that nudges exploit our mental weaknesses
(Bovens 2009, 209; Goodwin 2012, 86), or that they “deliberately circumvent
people’s rational reasoning and deliberating faculties” (Grüne-Yanoff 2012, 636),
or, similarly, that they are “circumventing the individual’s will” (Hausman and
Welch 2010, 130). If this is manipulative, jolting is manipulative in the same
way. However, I fail to see why it would be necessarily problematic to manipu-
late people in the sense of circumventing their rational will. As Sarah Buss has
argued, we are constantly subject to nonrational influence: “No rational chooser
can do anything without the aid of nonrational influences that determine how
she sees her choice situation and how she weighs the options she sees.” (2005,
214) That we are subject to such influence does not mean, Buss convincingly ar-
gues, that we cannot act for reasons, and for our own reasons. Moreover, whether
any particular circumvention of one’s rational self is or is not problematic would
seem to depend in part upon whether or not one welcomes such circumvention
(as has been proposed, for the case of nudges, by Wilkinson 2012, 13).
Perhaps, like the worry with deception, the worry here too is that, when our
rational selves are circumvented, we can become the instruments of someone
else’s will.20 The two worries can reinforce each other—influence that circum-
vents our rational selves may be harder to notice and counter. The issue of when
one agent becomes the instrument of another agent’s will is extremely rich and
complex, being central to such moral issues as the distinction between coercion
and manipulation, the nature of authenticity and of moral responsibility, and
the existence or not of a free will. I will have to leave this issue to one side, not-
ing only that if this is an objection to jolting, it is to the same extent an objection
to nudging.
The third and final argument that I will consider is that, as Adam Burgess
puts it, “nudging crucially limits the possibility of conscious learning and im-
provement” (2012, 16). Bovens similarly worries that “the long-term effect of
Nudge may be infantilisation” (2009, 214–215). On the face of it, there seems
to be no particular connection between the extent to which the choice context
is designed to promote legitimate aims and the extent to which people develop
morally. Sarah Conly considers this issue in detail concerning coercive paternal-
ism, noting that “rather than weakening people’s ability to make good decisions,
paternalistic legislation can help habituate them to making good decisions”.21
A related worry that may be underpinning the worry over infantilization is
that behavior supported by nudges will not be resilient. Thus, Bovens claims,
nudging “may leave the agent with a lack of moral strength to implement the tar-
get behavior once the regulation or the environment cues are no longer present”
20 Cf. Michael Garnett’s recent (2013) defense of self-rule as absence of rule by others.
21 In a presently unpublished manuscript, Andres Moles develops an analogous argument for the
case of nudging in particular.
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(2009, 24). Conly, drawing a parallel to public education, counters that we are
dependent on a great many things, and that if these things promote good out-
comes, our dependence on them is an argument for making them as permanent
as possible, rather than for avoiding them (2013, 68–69).
As Bovens admits, it is largely an empirical question what are the likely
effects of nudging when it comes to moral development and the resilience of
positive effects. I suspect that many concerns are due to the relative novelty
of nudging and the lack of familiarity with the tool among the general public.
While prohibitions are not novel in this way, the perspective that choice con-
tents are ever-present and designable may be. Jolting may admittedly have the
additional down-side that it removes options from view more effectively than
nudging, thus preventing the consideration of these options and so the moral
development that such consideration could otherwise yield. On the other hand,
if the options removed are immoral or otherwise undesirable, as they should be,
the effect on moral development may be positive. By removing options more
thoroughly, the effects of jolting may also be more resilient.
I conclude that the most common arguments against nudging are either un-
convincing or come down to the worry that nudging can make nudgees instru-
ments of another agent’s will. I propose that this risk is associated with many
different ways of influencing others and of shaping society, including some that
we cannot do without. I propose further that this risk should be taken seri-
ously in considering both nudging and jolting, but that it does in no way justify
a general abstention from either tool.
7. Respect for Preferences
That preferences are indeterminate or context-dependent is one of the starting
points for pro-nudgers. As I noted above, judgments too are indeterminate in the
same way (indeed, a preference arguably is a form of judgment). This is why it is
difficult to claim that any particular nudge promotes chooser wellbeing accord-
ing to the choosers’ own judgment. Even so, it is a central tenant of liberalism
that individual preferences should be respected. This is presumably why Thaler
and Sunstein defer the question of legitimate aims to chooser preference, de-
spite the obvious problems associated with eliciting these preferences. Respect
for preferences may be of independent importance, or it may be instrumental to
the promotion of wellbeing. Either way, it is important, or so I will presume.
Concern with chooser preference is also a likely basis for arguments against
jolting. Though options that are not accessible are often not considered and so
not preferred, they can certainly be preferred. When they are, keeping them
inaccessible conflicts with respect for preferences. Though I have rejected the
freedom-preservation argument for nudges, most nudges do allow all or almost
all choosers access to their preferred option at a cost that is at least not pro-
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hibitive. Jolting, in contrast, makes options completely inaccessible, or pro-
hibitively costly.
What does it mean that an inaccessible option is preferred? I explained above
that it is morally irrelevant that some option would be chosen from a non-actual
choice set, since this is true for (almost) all options.22 Accepting this, we could
start elaborating on the degree to which some options are preferred over oth-
ers over various possible choice sets. However, I fail to see why this would be
relevant. Actual preferences should arguably be taken seriously as a matter of
respect for persons and their choices. Preferences in non-actual choice situations
warrant no such respect, because no one actually has them.
The fact that an option would have been preferred under non-actual circum-
stances should be distinguished from the fact that a non-present option is missed
in the actual circumstances. Options that are not present in a choice cannot be
chosen, of course, but they can still be preferred in the sense that we think, and
perhaps state, that we would have chosen them if they were present.
We may also think that it would have been better to have access to certain
options, even if we do not think we would have chosen them. This is essentially
Berlin’s argument, against Hobbes, for the importance of non-preferred options
to the concept of (negative) liberty (2002[1969], 32). Whether or not we (think
we) would have chosen it, we may call regret over the absence of some option
lack-of-option regret. To illustrate: From the choice set {C, D, E, F}, the cafeteria
costumer chooses C. I said this might be because she is attracted to the least
unhealthy option, given that it is not too dull. This psychology is consistent
with the customer regretting that A and B are not available, perhaps thinking
(mistakenly, as it happens) that she would have chosen one of them, given the
chance.
Lack-of-option regret is an actual state of mind, unlike preferences in non-
actual circumstances. Lack of option regret is, or implies, a preference over
choice sets. If the person experiencing lack-of-option regret could opt to have her
choice set expanded to include the option she regrets not having, she would. To
regret that an option is inaccessible is to prefer that the option set be expanded
to include it. I propose that we should, ceteris paribus, respect preferences over
choice sets, just as we should respect preferences over options in a choice set
(indeed, sometimes choice sets are options).
Preferences over choice sets do not only come in the form of lack-of-option
regret. As just noted, lack-of-option regret is a preference for expanding the cur-
rent choice set. It is also possible to prefer a reduction of the current choice set.
People often have this preference when they shop for utilities such as electricity,
where the available options do not differ in the essential service provided, but
this lack of relevant differences is obscured by how options are presented (with
various creative marketing techniques).
We can have preferences over choice sets also for choices we are not currently
facing. We can have preferences regarding specific choices, such as wishing there
22 There may be some options that are dispreferred in all possible choice sets in which they are
members, but these options are very few.
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will be a rich selection of sweaters in the store we plan on visiting tomorrow, or
wishing that there will be no candy bars on sale in the supermarket the next
time we shop there. We can also have more general preferences, such as a prefer-
ence for facing fewer choices with large choice sets, because these choices tend to
use up valuable time and effort. Importantly, we can have preferences over sets
of choice sets that regard the aggregate content of those choices. For example,
we may prefer not to have too many options to consume or purchase unhealthy
foodstuffs any given day. We may think that it is fine to have an option to have
a bun with the morning coffee, or an option to have a bun with the afternoon
coffee, but not both these options. This is not a preference for any single choice
set, but for the aggregate content of, in this case, two choice sets.
My brief investigation of preferences for inaccessible options has led me to
note various possible preferences over choice sets. Lack-of-option regret can
either consist in preferring an inaccessible option, or in preferring that some
non-preferred option be accessible. The former preference is not always the more
important. It is often more important to respect my preference for having access
to a rich variety of options, than to respect my preference for there being some
particular option that I would ideally like to choose.
I opened this section with granting the importance of respect for preference
and the relevance of the argument against jolting that it can block preferred
options. I end it by proposing that if respect for preferences is important, this
includes preferences over choice sets, and so we must aggregate preferences for
options and preferences for option sets in order to see how we can best respect
preferences. Nudges and jolts of course typically target groups, and so the ag-
gregate will include many preferences of each type. As preference-respecters, we
will face difficult dilemmas, such as whether to respect some people’s preference
for making harmful options inaccessible, or respect other people’s preference for
keeping those options accessible, and perhaps for actually choosing them.
In conclusion: Choice content design sometimes operates just like choice con-
text design in that it causes a chooser to prefer another option than she would
have preferred in the absence of the design, without any negative experiences
such as lack-of-option regret. While we should respect actual preferences, we
have no reason to respect hypothetical preferences in non-actual choices. Our re-
spect for actual preferences should not stop at preferences over options in choice
sets, but should extent to preferences over choice sets, which come both in the
form of preferences for some choice sets over others, and in the form of more
aggregate properties of choice sets, such as the overall complexity and number
of choices we must make.
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8. Conclusion
In this article, I have defended both nudging and what I have called jolting.
These are two different types of choice design. I have not been concerned to
distinguish the two in detail, and it is not important for me that they can be
distinguished, since I endorse both. On the other hand, the distinction is impor-
tant for libertarian paternalists and others who endorse nudging but not jolting.
Roughly speaking, nudging is design of the context in which a choice in made,
while jolting is design of the content of the choice.
I have argued that nudging may sometimes have strong incentive effects,
such as when a default must be set and the opt-out cost is quite high. Jolting
has even stronger incentive effects, or may make options physically impossible
to access. I have argued that strong incentive effects are not problematic as
such, since they are often morally unavoidable in the sense that every choice
must have some content and no particular content is morally neutral. I called
this the argument from non-neutrality and explained how it is a modification of
Thaler and Sunstein’s argument from unavoidability.
Because of non-neutrality, different choice designs should be judged on their
merits, irrespective of how they have come about. Littering public places with
unmanned candy stores is not morally neutral, nor is abstaining from doing
so. I granted that environments that have not been designed to influence us
at all may be an exception to this general rule—perhaps such environments
are morally neutral after all, or perhaps they have some special quality that
overrides concerns with choice outcomes. Most choice environments, however,
are not free of design in this strong sense.
I have considered three common arguments against nudging and how they
may be relevant for jolting as well. I have found these arguments either uncon-
vincing or dependent on the idea that nudging or jolting can make one agent
the instrument of another agent’s will. I have not addressed this very common
concern, except by noting that it is not particular to nudging or jolting. I have
explained how the arguments are no stronger against jolting than against nudg-
ing.23
I have argued that neither the fact that jolting may limit liberty nor the
fact that it may remove options that would otherwise have been preferred are
reasons to reject jolting. I have investigated the different preferences we may
have regarding our choices and I have endorsed the liberal position that, ceteris
paribus, people should have what they prefer to have, whether their preferences
concern options in single choice sets, the choice sets themselves, or aggregate
properties of several choice sets. Respect for preferences, therefore, does not
preclude either nudging or jolting, but rather makes them important tools for
satisfying preferences.
23 This strand of my argument could be taken as a reductio of the pro-nuding position, but this is
not how I intend it.
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In conclusion, the question is not whether nudging and jolting should be
used, but what they should be used for, and when.
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